Flanged Tritium Waste Containers

The main objective of radioactive waste management is to protect workers, the public and the environment from the potential harmful effects of radioactive waste and to minimize the burden for future generations.

This operation will be conducted with the utmost considerations for safety to LANL employees, the surrounding communities, and the environment. The FTWC depressurization remediation plan is designed to eliminate the chance of an uncontrolled, unmitigated, or unmonitored release of radioactive material from the containers.

Current Project Status

Sunday, October 5

Update #3: FTWC #1 has been successfully moved to the Lab’s Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility. There were no emissions from today’s operations. Updates will be provided prior to the next movement operation.

Update #2: The first FTWC has been loaded and is being transported to WETF.

Update #1: We’ve begun field operations for movement of the FTWCs to the Lab’s Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF). All four FTWCs remain in safe and secure configuration. Updates will be provided throughout the day.

Wednesday, October 1

We will resume FTWC operations this Sunday and are planning to begin to move the FTWCs from Area G to the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility. Movement does not involve any emissions, although if increased pressure is observed in any container, we will perform additional safe and secure configuration work that could involve emissions. We will provide updates throughout the operation as we have been.

Tuesday, September 30

Safe and secure configuration has been completed on all four FTWCs. The total radiological dose for the operation to date is less than 0.0125 millirem to a hypothetical, maximally exposed individual member of the public at the site boundary using actual monitoring data and actual weather conditions.

During movement activities, the possibility exists that slight pressure could build in the headspace of the container. We will monitor that closely. If any of the containers experience a pressure increase, we will need to mitigate that pressure, and we may see emissions during those operations.

Updates will be provided before movement activities occur.

Monday, September 29

Update #4: The FTWC safe configuration has been completed on the fourth FTWC and we’ve concluded operations for the day. Total tritium emissions for the day’s operations were less than 70 curies, which is less than 0.025 mrem to a hypothetical maximally exposed individual at the site boundary using the real time monitoring data and the bounding weather conditions.

This completes the safe and secure configuration work for all four FTWCs. The next step is to move all four FTWCs, one at a time, to the lab’s Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF). During movement, the possibility exists that slight pressure could build in the headspace of the container. We will monitor that closely. If any of the containers experience a pressure increase, we will need to mitigate that pressure, and we may see emissions during those operations. We will continue to provide updates throughout the day as we work through the movement stage.

Update #3: Safe and secure operations continue on the fourth FTWC. Emissions so far today are less than 26 curies, which is less than 0.008 mrem offsite to a hypothetical maximally exposed individual at the site boundary using the real time monitoring data and the bounding weather conditions.

Update #2: Safe and secure operations continue on the fourth FTWC. Emissions so far today are less than 13 curies, which is less than 0.0004 mrem offsite to a hypothetical maximally exposed individual at the site boundary using the real time monitoring data and the bounding weather conditions.

Update #1: We’ve begun FTWC operations and will continue work to place the one remaining container in the safe and secure configuration. We will provide updates throughout the day.

Thursday, September 25

Update #4: The FTWC safe configuration has been completed on the third FTWC and we’ve concluded operations for the day. Total tritium emissions for the day’s operations were less than 1.5 curies, which is less than 0.0004 mrem to a hypothetical maximally exposed individual at the site boundary using the real time monitoring data and the bounding weather conditions. Total tritium emissions from the operation so far are less than 53 curies. Using actual weather data and formal analytical results, the calculated off-site dose consequence is less than 0.005 mrem to a modeled/hypothetical maximally exposed member of the public.

We plan to resume Monday, September 29, at 7:00 a.m. to continue operations to get the one remaining FTWC in a safe and secure configuration. We may see emissions during those operations and will continue to provide updates throughout the day. We will not perform FTWC operations from Friday, September 26, through Sunday, September 28, due to forecasted rain.

Update #3: Safe and secure operations continue on the third FTWC. Emissions so far today are less than 0.9 curies, which is less than 0.0002 mrem offsite to a hypothetical maximally exposed individual at the site boundary using the real time monitoring data and the bounding weather conditions.

Update #2: Safe and secure operations continue on the third FTWC. Emissions so far today are less than 0.8 curies, which is less than 0.0002 mrem offsite to a hypothetical maximally exposed individual at the site boundary using the real time monitoring data and the bounding weather conditions.

Update #1: We’ve begun FTWC operations and will continue work to place the remaining two containers in the safe and secure configuration. We will provide updates throughout the day.

Wednesday, September 24

Update #5: The FTWC safe configuration has been completed on the second FTWC and we’ve concluded operations for the day. Total tritium emissions for the day’s operations were less than 10 curies, which is less than 0.0033 millirem offsite using the real time monitoring data and the bounding weather conditions. Total tritium emissions from the operation so far are less than 52 curies. Using actual weather data and formal analytical results, the calculated off-site dose consequence is less than 0.005 millirem to a modeled/hypothetical maximally exposed member of the public.

We plan to resume tomorrow, September 25, at 7:00 a.m. to continue operations to get the two remaining FTWCs in a safe and secure configuration. We may see emissions during those operations and will continue to provide updates throughout the day.

Update #4: Placing the containers in a safe and secure configuration involves slightly pressurizing each FTWC with helium to perform a leak check. That helium is then let out through the capture system and then we apply a slight vacuum to provide additional safety margin. Once all four containers are in safe and secure configuration, we will begin moving them, one at a time, to the Lab’s Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility. This is a very slow and deliberate process to both mitigate any pressure differences inside the containers and to maximize the effectiveness of the capture system. We are committed to minimizing emissions in all stages of the operation.

Update #3:

Ftw Cs With Pm Ms — The four FTWCs, each with a pressure monitoring manifold installed.

Update #2: Operations continue. Emissions so far today are less than 2.5 curies. Offsite dose using worst case weather file is less than 0.001 mrem (actual weather file will be lower).

Update #1: We’ve begun FTWC operations, and will continue our work to place the remaining three containers in a safe and secure configuration. We will provide updates throughout the day.

Tuesday, September 23

Update #4: The pressure monitoring manifold leak check has been performed on the fourth FTWC and we’ve concluded operations for the day. Total tritium emissions for the day’s operations were less than 0.25 curies, which is less than 0.0001 millirem offsite using the real time monitoring data and the bounding weather conditions. Total tritium emissions from the operation so far are less than 41 curies. Using actual weather data and formal analytical results, the calculated off-site dose consequence is less than 0.005 millirem to a modeled/hypothetical maximally exposed member of the public.

We plan to resume tomorrow, September 24, at 7:00 a.m. to continue operations to get all four FTWCs in a safe and secure configuration. We may see emissions during those operations and will continue to provide updates throughout the day.

Update #3: Depressurization step is complete on the fourth FTWC. No internal pressure was observed in the container headspace (zero psi). We are continuing in the procedure and may see some emissions as we work through the steps to place the FTWC in a secure configuration. We will continue to send updates on status and any emissions.

Update #2: All prerequisite checks have been successfully completed. We have installed the depressurization manifold on the fourth FTWC and will begin depressurization within the next hour.

Update #1: We’ve begun field operations at Area G, and we’ll be providing updates throughout the day.

Monday, September 22

Update #2: The Lab will resume FTWCs depressurization operations Tuesday, September 23. Updates will be provided throughout the day on progress.

Update #1: Due to rain in the forecast, we will not be performing depressurization activities today. We plan to resume tomorrow.

Sunday, September 21

Update #6: The pressure monitoring manifold leak check has been performed on the third FTWC and we’ve concluded operations for the day. Total tritium emissions for the day’s operations were less than 6 curies, which is less than 0.002 mrem offsite using the bounding weather conditions. Total tritium emissions from the operation so far are less than 41 curies. Using actual weather data, the calculated off-site dose consequence is less than 0.005 millirem to a modeled/hypothetical maximally exposed member of the public.

We plan to resume operations Monday, September 22 at 7:00 a.m. to depressurize the fourth FTWC.

Update #5: Depressurization step is complete on the third FTWC. No internal pressure was observed in the container headspace (zero psi). We are continuing in the procedure and may see some emissions as we work through the steps to place the container in a secure configuration. We will continue to send updates.

Update #4: All prerequisites have been successfully completed. We will begin depressurization of the third FTWC within an hour.

Update #3: One of the prerequisite checks was not satisfactorily met in accordance with the procedure, so we will be pausing to correct prior to resuming operations. Upon successful completion, we will proceed as planned with depressurization of the third FTWC. We will provide another update prior to depressurization.

Update #2: We have installed the depressurization manifold on the third FTWC and will begin depressurization within the next hour.

Update #1: We’ve begun operations for the day, and are preforming equipment set up and prerequisite checks. We plan to depressurize the third FTWC today.

Saturday, September 20

Update #4: The pressure monitoring manifold leak check has been performed, and we’ve concluded operations for the day. Total tritium emissions for the day’s operations were less than 0.12 curies—less than 0.00005 millirem offsite. Total tritium emissions from the operation so far are less than 35 curies. The calculated off-site dose consequence is 0.005 millirem to a modeled/hypothetical maximally exposed member of the public.

Update #3: The pressure monitoring manifold has been installed on the second FTWC. Total emissions from the second FTWC so far today is less than 0.2 curies.

Update #2: Depressurization is now complete. There was no pressure in the container. We are continuing in the procedure and may see some emissions as we work through the steps to place in a secure configuration.

Update #1: All equipment checks have passed, drum lids have been removed, and installation of the depressurization manifold on the second FTWC has been completed. Depressurization will begin in approximately one hour.

Thursday, September 18

In order to service some equipment associated with depressurizing the second FTWCs container and due to expected adverse weather conditions, operations are postponed until Saturday per our schedule.

We’ve had a productive day prepping equipment, incorporating improvements from the successful completion of the first FTWC, and making preparations to resume operations on Saturday. We plan to begin FTWC depressurization operations on the second FTWC on Saturday, September 20. We plan to continue operations on Sunday, September 21, to depressurize the third FTWC. No FTWC operations will be performed on Friday, September 19. Any changes to the weekend plans will be posted.

Wednesday, September 17

Completed operations on FTWC 225 (the first FTWC) with securing and pumping down the pressure monitoring manifold. FTWC 229 (the second FTWC) operations were started, including drum lid removal. Depressurization operations for 229 are planned for September 18. Total tritium emissions for the operation so far is less than 35 curies. The calculated off-site dose consequence is 0.005 millirem to a modeled/hypothetical maximally exposed member of the public. This is an informal/non-official number shared for communication purposes. We will do peer review and validation prior to final reporting.

Ftwc Sept 17 25 — FTWCs operation ventilation and air monitoring equipment at Area G

Tuesday, September 16

Depressurization operations were performed on the first FTWC today, and no internal pressure was found. That indicates that the inner containers in this FTWC had not leaked. Air monitoring indicated no deviation from background levels. Planned operations for Wednesday, September 17, will be the depressurization of the next (second) FTWC.

Monday, September 15

On Monday, September 15, 2025, operations continued at TA-54 Area G for the FTWC pressure mitigation activity. We opened the first overpack container and performed air sampling in the overpack. Preparations were made to install the venting manifold.

Monitoring showed no detectable tritium activity.

We intend to continue pressure mitigation operations on Tuesday, September 16.

Downloads

Ftwc 1 Body Side Image 420x275 — A Flanged Tritium Waste Container (FTWC) is a stainless-steel certified pressure vessel designed for long-term storage of tritium-contaminated waste items. The Laboratory is planning to vent headspace gases from four of these containers.

Questions and Answers

This question and answer list is in response to the inquiries NNSA received by email and during the second public information session held November 5, 2020. Many new questions are addressed here, with similar questions condensed, consolidated, or paraphrased. Duplicate questions have not been repeated, but are still available in the "Additional Questions and Answers" section that follows this one. Our answers are intended to be fully responsive to the broader intent of every question we received.

Q. What practical steps do you recommend residents consider during active venting (e.g., staying indoors, closing windows/vents, limiting outdoor activity for children, elders, pregnant people)?

We don’t have any recommendations for modifying activities as we do not anticipate any offsite impact.

Q. Should people avoid collecting rainwater, irrigating, or harvesting produce during/just after venting? If so, for how long?

No, we do not anticipate any offsite impact.

Q. Are masks (e.g., N95/KN95) helpful for reducing inhalation risk of tritiated water vapor? Any guidance for indoor air (filters/HVAC settings)?

No, we do not anticipate any offsite impact from these operations.

Q. Any special guidance for vulnerable groups (infants, pregnant people, those with respiratory illness), farmworkers, and people who rely on acequias or private wells? Should nearby farmers try to harvest foods beforehand?

No, we do not anticipate any offsite impact from these operations.

Q. What are the specific weather thresholds (wind/rain/humidity) that will trigger postponement or pause of venting? How and when are those decisions made each day?

We’ve established specific emission limits based on bounding weather conditions. Each day, LANL meteorologists will ensure the day’s forecast is within those evaluated bounding conditions. The only condition that would postpone operations would be if the forecast is outside our evaluated condition or if lighting or other weather conditions make the work unsafe at Area G. Decisions are made each morning prior to operations.

Q. What real-time monitoring will be in place during venting, and what will the public be able to see in near-real time (e.g., dashboard, map, time-stamped readings)?

Emissions will be monitored in real time by LANL and EPA personnel to ensure release limits are not exceeded. Daily summaries will be generated addressing operations, emissions, and any offsite radiological dose. Those daily summaries will be published in the Electronic Public Reading Room as soon as practical, taking into consideration requirements for public release.

Q. In the event of an unanticipated release or incident, what are the exact steps and timelines for public notification?

o Channels: Wireless Emergency Alerts, Reverse-911, radio/TV, social media, email lists, door-to-door for nearby residents, coordination with Pueblos and counties.

o Time standard: Within how many minutes will alerts be issued to the public?

LANL Emergency Operations Support Center will be monitoring the operation and if necessary, will follow the standard process for notifications for any LANL event that might have an offsite consequence. An Everbridge message would be emailed to the affected offsite agency with the Emergency Notification Form (ERO-FORM-009) attached. Soon after, an EOSC operator would call the affected agency to confirm they have received the form detailing the Protective Action Recommendation. Our operators log who they talked to verify they received the form.

Even a worst-case release would not require any protective action by any member of the public.

Q. What protective actions should the public take if an incident occurs (shelter-in-place, avoid water contact, etc.)?

Even a worst-case release would not require any protective action by any member of the public. We do not anticipate any off-site impact.

Q. What hotlines/points of contact should residents call for health questions or to report issues (NMDOH nurse line, county EM, LANL info line)? Please include Spanish contact options.

We cannot advise on health-related questions, but we do not anticipate any off-site impact.

Q. Where can residents find a single landing page for updates, daily status, and after-action information (in English and Spanish)?

Please see LANL’s public-facing website on the flanged tritium waste containers. The Electronic Public Reading Room also will have daily summaries addressing operations, emissions, and any offsite radiological dose. Those daily summaries will be published as soon as practical.

Q. For the post-activity public meeting required by NMED, please provide: date/time window, virtual access details, how comments will be received/responded to, and when the recording and comment-response table will be posted.

We’ll alert the public to details of this public meeting as soon as the date and time is available.

Q. Will guidance and alerts be provided in Spanish and Tribal languages as requested? If yes, please share the plan for translation and distribution.

Standard emergency response procedures, as detailed above, will be followed in the event of an incident.

Q. What methods of communication will be used in the case of any problems during the treatment process that result in an unanticipated release of tritium exceeding the conditions of [the] temporary authorization?

Q. What is the geographic area/radius of the public that will be notified in the case of any problems during the treatment process that result in an unanticipated release of tritium exceeding the conditions of [the] temporary authorization?

The 30-mile radius outside LANL would be the first notification area.

Q. What methods of communication were used to notify the public and Tribal communities three days prior to commencing operations?

Multiple communication channels were used to notify the public and tribes, including a public notice, direct tribal communications and a public meeting.

Q. What is the geographic area/radius of the public and Tribal communities that were notified three days prior to commencing operations?

The public notice made three days prior to commencing operations was distributed via LANL’s Electronic Public Reading Room, which is available to everyone in the public. All tribes within a 30-mile radius also were notified.

Q. Can you vent without the NMED Temporary Authorization?

No.

Q. Where is this activity addressed in the Consent Order?

The FTWCs are not addressed in the Consent Order, as they are not categorized as legacy waste. They are located at Technical Area 54's (TA-54) Area G, and their removal is necessary to support larger waste reduction goals.

Q. Will you vent four days in a row?

The operation to mitigate the pressure in the four FTWCs is planned for two days per container, for a total of eight days. Those days may not be consecutive to allow for contingencies such as other operations and inclement weather.

Q. How is the higher risk tritium in oxide or vapor form (HTO) being mitigated?

The molecular sieve material in the capture system of the FTWCs is specifically engineered to capture HTO.

Q. What are the cumulative impacts from this release?

There are no cumulative impacts from this operation. All limits are conservative, and well within regulatory limits that are protective of the public.

Q. What alternatives have been considered for this operation?

Numerous alternatives were considered in the design of this project, with an overview of those alternatives discussed in the public information sessions and the first question and answer document posted on the LANL Website and the Electronic Public Reading Room. Permanent disposition of this waste supports waste and risk reduction priorities for the DOE and regional stakeholders. Disposition alternatives and strategies considered included leave in place, transportation without pressure mitigation, and pressure mitigation before transportation.

Additional strategies considered included placing the containers in a secondary and tertiary containment, and numerous pressure mitigation and capture strategies. The selected option, while more complex and expensive than many alternatives, was deemed to be the safest option for both the workers and the public. All aspects of the design are engineered to maximize safety, capture efficiency, and minimize additional waste generation.

Q. Have you analyzed the specific impacts to communities in the area?

We have evaluated potential doses for this operation, and all LANL operations, at a variety of locations in and around LANL, including Santa Clara Pueblo and San Ildefonso Pueblo. Radiological dose consequence at these areas is less than one-tenth of the dose that would be received by the hypothetical maximally exposed individual (MEI) in White Rock. Limits calculated for the White Rock MEI will therefore be protective of all population centers.

Q. How can you say that site limits cannot be exceeded?

Only one container at a time will be vented, and the inventory of a single container, even with 100% of the headspace gas released, would not exceed the permit limits. Additionally, real time monitoring is in place to monitor the operation, and the process can be paused and placed in a safe configuration at any time as needed.

Q. What is the EPA’s role in this project? The NMED?

EPA Region 6 approves the air emissions permit request for this project, and the NMED approves the treatment process as these containers are Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)-regulated waste. LANL also uses the EPA’s Clean Air Act Assessment Package - 1988 (CAP-88) emissions models. This operation would require the same permits and approvals, regardless of the specific design of the process, anticipated release quantities, and timing of the operation.

Q. What is the effectiveness of the capture system?

Effectiveness of the capture system can vary by container contents, pressure release rates, and temperatures. The project’s goal is to perform the operation in a manner that maximizes capture effectiveness and keeps any potential release as low as reasonably achievable. The real time monitoring system ensures these goals are met.

Q. We’ve heard three numbers for potential dose: 20 mrem, 10 mrem, and 8 mrem. Can you explain?

The permitting process requires analysis of the worst-case scenario. For this project, that would be a 100% release of the contents of all four containers (approximately 114,000 curies) with no mitigation or capture. That is not a realistic or possible scenario, since the operation is designed to only vent the hydrogen, oxygen, and small quantities of tritium in the headspace of each container, a very small fraction of the total contents, and only one container at a time. In this worst-case, bounding scenario, the Maximally Exposed Individual (MEI), under the least favorable meteorological conditions, could receive 20 mrem. As previously stated, this is not a likely scenario, and only used for a worst-case bounding criteria.

The site release limit for all airborne radionuclides, combined from all LANL operations, is 10 mrem per year to any Maximally Exposed Individual member of the public.

This specific project has set a limit of 8 mrem for the entire operation at the site boundary for the MEI. However, the project’s goal is to limit any release to the lowest possible quantity to achieve a safe configuration for transport. The desired and likely offsite dose for this project will be extremely low – below the 8 mrem, possibly even 0 mrem, at the site boundary.

Q. What will the Laboratory do if the site limit is exceeded?

In the very unlikely event that the site limit is exceeded, LANL would make the required formal notifications to all regulators, and follow the established processes defined in state and federal regulations.

Q. What is the difference between Triad and N3B?

Triad is the management and operations (M&O) contractor for the NNSA and operates the majority of LANL operations. N3B is the legacy cleanup contractor for DOE EM and manages operations at TA-54 Area G, where the four FTWCs are located. This project is a joint operation, with collaboration between the two DOE entities (NNSA and DOE EM) and the two contractors, Triad and N3B. Triad is responsible for the operation, and N3B manages the site where the FTWCs are located.

Q. Have you performed “puff” modeling?

An evaluation of the CALPUFF code in comparison with our standard CAP-88 code completed in 2002 showed that CAP-88 is conservative for distances over 300 meters from the source. At the distances applicable for this project – 2100 meters or more – the use of CAP-88 will be a conservative estimate of radiological dose.

Q. Is LANL considering plant, animal, and soil impacts?

LANL’s annual Biota Dose Assessment includes this evaluation, and is published in the Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER).

Q. What is the urgency for this project? Is there a financial incentive or bonus for completing the project by a certain time?

There is currently a window of time in which safe and compliant controlled pressure release can be performed. Once that time passes – likely in less than two years – any effort to move or mitigate the containers becomes much more difficult and introduces new risks, including possible curtailment of Area G cleanup efforts. There is no financial incentive tied to the disposition of these containers.

Q. How are these FTWCs different from WIPP drums?
These four containers hold different constituents. They are not transuranic waste, which is the type of waste that is stored at WIPP.

Q. How will you make data and results available to the public in real time, that is, as soon as you have final results?

Emissions results from the operation will be posted in the Electronic Public Reading Room (ePRR) and the ASER. Additionally, an EPA representative will attend the operation. Results will be published in a timely manner in accordance with federal reporting processes.

Additional Questions and Answers

Q. What is a Flanged Tritium Waste Container and why do you need them?

The main objective of radioactive waste management is to protect workers, public and the environment from the potential harmful effects of radioactive waste and to minimize the burden for future generations. An important task for waste management is to translate general waste acceptance requirements into detailed waste package specifications. Flanged Tritium Waste Containers (FTWCs) are specifically designed to provide radiation shielding and/or physical containment to restrict or prevent the spread of contamination as an engineered component for ensuring the safe management of radioactive waste.

Q. What is tritium and what is it used for?

Tritium is a radioactive form of hydrogen gas and an important component in nuclear weapons.

Q. Why are these drums at Area G?

These FTWCs were packaged at LANL’s Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) in 2007 and sent to Area G for permanent disposal.

During an audit of containers, NNSA identified a small amount of lead in the materials inside the FTWCs, resulting in the containers being designated as hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and requiring offsite disposal. Further analysis identified the potential for a flammable, pressurized mixture of hydrogen and oxygen in the FTWC headspace, requiring venting of headspace gases to enable personnel to safely move the containers.

Ftwc 2 Body Side Image 420x275 — Laboratory engineers have done a careful analysis of the venting process to ensure that any releases are carefully controlled. The system pictured here, has been specifically engineered to capture the form of tritium expected in the FTWC headspace.

Q. Why is venting necessary?

The Laboratory has a goal of reducing the volume of waste on site. As part of this effort, the four FTWCs were identified for treatment on site and eventual shipment to a licensed off-site facility. Before the containers are moved to WETF, pressure built up inside must be relieved. Once the pressure is relieved, the containers will be transported to WETF for further treatment prior to shipment to a licensed off-site facility.

Q. Why are you doing this now?

NNSA is conducting these activities to support safe operations at LANL, including mitigating risks to the public and the environment, and to enable the disposition of radiological and hazardous waste as required by our permits and DOE Orders. These operations are being conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory requirements.

Q. When do you plan to vent the containers?

Venting of the drums was previously postponed indefinitely due to impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. NNSA and Triad are working with regulatory agencies to determine a revised schedule.

The operation will be conducted with the utmost considerations for safety to Laboratory employees, the public and the environment.

Q. Is there any danger to public health and safety?

No. Our engineers have a proven safe and effective method to vent the FTWCs under carefully controlled conditions. Additionally, only one container at a time will be vented, and the venting process will undergo real-time monitoring to ensure DOE and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requirements on radioactive dose limit are not exceeded. The operation will be conducted with the utmost considerations for safety to Laboratory employees, the public and the environment.

Q. How do you know venting is safe?

Laboratory engineers have done a careful analysis of the venting process to ensure that the release is controlled. The process has been tested at WETF and proven effective. This methodology has been evaluated and observed by representatives from the EPA who will be monitoring the effort. Additionally, strict limits have been placed on the amount of tritium that can be released and we will be monitoring closely to ensure those limits are not exceeded.

Throughout the process, Laboratory engineers will carefully monitor the amounts of tritium released. We have also developed a system to capture much of the gas while it is being released. Strict regulatory limits prevent releasing more than the amount allowed for each individual container. These precautions are designed to prevent any off-site health impacts.

Ftwc 3 Body Side Image 420x275 — The ventilation system used is carefully monitored for contamination during assembly and disassembly. These and other precautions are designed to prevent any on-site and off-site health impacts.

Q. How many FTWCs will be vented?

There are four containers.

Q. What is the process?

Each of the four containers will be vented separately, one at a time, at TA-54's Area G. The venting process will allow the vast majority of the tritium to be captured through a dedicated filtering system designed for tritium capture. We also have a real-time monitoring system integrated into the exhaust and emission system.

Q. Are there other ways to treat this waste that does not involve releases to the atmosphere?

No. NNSA has been working with the regulators to determine the safest method to enable movement of these containers from TA-54 to WETF for further treatment and shipment to a licensed off-site disposal facility. WETF has all the appropriate infrastructure to safely manage tritium.

Q. Why not do the venting at WETF instead of Area G?

The purpose for the venting is to enable us to safely move the drums from Area G to WETF, where we have the appropriate infrastructure to further treat and safely manage tritium.

Q. What is the distance between Bldg. 1028 at TA-54, where the containers are stored, and the nearest resident in White Rock?

It is 2200 meters from Bldg. 1028 to the closest business or residence location in White Rock; about 1.3 miles.

Ftwc 4 Body Side Image 420x275 — In addition to the monitoring equipment we are using to measure the release, the Laboratory has four air monitors in White Rock to ensure that we track any radioactive particles that may reach the area. The data will be available in our annual emissions report to the EPA and in our ASER.

Q. How are emissions monitored and evaluated?

To predict the off-site dose consequences from these releases, we are using worst-case computer models to establish daily emissions limits. At the end of each day of operation, we recalculate this dose consequence using actual wind from that day. The process then repeats, using worst case modeling to ensure no limits are ever exceeded. This ensures the protection of our personnel, the public, and the environment.

Q. Where are the relevant White Rock air monitors?

We have four monitors in White Rock: at the bottom of Pajarito Road, at the old White Rock Fire Station (Rover & NM-4), at “Rocket Park,” and near Pajarito Acres (Monte Rey South & NM-4). These all measure airborne radioactive particulates and tritium oxide. The data will be available in our annual emissions report to the EPA and in our ASER.

We have real-time monitoring to prevent a release from exceeding established limits.

Q. Can you confirm that the highest dose possible off-site is estimated at 20 millirem?

Yes. For EPA planning purposes, we modeled the entire contents of the four FTWCs released to the air, using average wind conditions and no filtering system. This resulted in the 20 millirem off-site dose. In reality, we will not be venting the entire contents – just that fraction which is in the headspace of the four containers. The operations will take place in a slow, controlled manner, using filtration to remove as much tritium as possible.

NNSA will monitor the releases to ensure we stay well below the EPA limit of 10 mrem per year. We will not conduct operations in adverse wind conditions.

NNSA has developed plans to ensure that the 10 mrem level will not be reached by using emissions controls (filters) on the exhaust system and actively monitoring the emissions in real-time. Operations will not occur if the wind speed and direction are unfavorable.

Ftwc 5 Body Side Image 420x275 — Venting will be conducted in a controlled manner to enable monitoring and control of the pressure in a manner that maintains the safety of our personnel, the public and the environment.

Note: Background radiation dose in this part of Northern New Mexico is about 1 mrem per day or more – about 350-400 mrem per year. The EPA and the Clean Air Act allow DOE facilities to emit radioactive material that could contribute up to 10 mrem per year above this background level. LANL’s emissions for the past several years have been a fraction of 1 mrem per year. For comparison, a cross-country round-trip airplane flight results in about 3.7 mrem of radiation exposure.

Q. What agencies are overseeing this process?

The EPA for radiological air quality emissions, the NMED for RCRA treatment, and federal regulators from the DOE for radiological emissions.

Q. What happens to the four FTWCs when the venting is complete?

They will be safely transported to another location on-site at LANL where the contents will be repackaged into Department of Transportation-compliant containers and then shipped offsite to a licensed storage facility.

Contact

Flanged Tritium Waste Containers
Public Information
Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos, NM 87545
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