Changing Times in the Division

George A. Keyworth, II, P-Division Leader (1978-1981)

Mike Moore, George Auchampaugh, and I joined Ben Diven’s group of mavericks (P-3) in the fall of 1968. Each of us came to P-3 with different expectations but shared an overarching common interest—fine structure in nuclear reactions. Just a few months out of Duke, I had been immersed in analogue states; I was looking for the near-ideal opportunity to use polarized targets and beams of polarized neutrons to examine a somewhat parallel phenomenon in subthreshold fission. What we only barely perceived at that time was that we were experiencing the “last hurrah” of classical nuclear structure—at least as it had been for three decades. Our tools were the best, including Ben Diven and Art Hemmendinger’s (W-8) cleverly conceived program using small nuclear tests as intense pulsed-neutron sources. The challenge, and the opportunity, was to look beyond the realm of cross sections and angular distributions where the quest for new phenomena was gradually being replaced by new precision and to envision how the powerful experimental techniques of nuclear physics could be applied beyond nuclear structure.

When Ben Diven asked me to replace him as Group Leader of P-3 in 1974, he had already developed a comprehensive program using time-of-flight techniques to explore equations of state in exotic materials and at exotic pressures and temperatures. This program helped us develop new working relationships with the Field Test (J), Design Engineering (WX), and Theoretical (T) Divisions. P-3 was developing into a weapons-physics group but with the tools of nuclear physics to explore high energy-density matter. Moreover, the Weapons Neutron Research (WNR) Facility was on the horizon at the Los Alamos Meson Physics Facility (LAMPF), the laser-fusion program was growing in the Laboratory, and the oil crisis was leading Congress amok.

In 1978, I joined Hank Motz in the Physics (P) Division Office. The dilemma we faced was easy to describe: how to help guide the skills we had into new areas that were becoming part of a more diversified Los Alamos and yet of a sufficiently fundamental nature to attract the best new graduates into the Laboratory. Group P-4’s discovery of gamma-ray bursts created great excitement and caused us to place more emphasis on astrophysical theory and modeling. I was excited by the new emerging questions regarding the fundamental properties of neutrinos. These questions, which were prompted by theory and by “missing” solar neutrinos, arose just as we needed a good test of the future role of P Division.

I envisioned P Division as having two roles in the Laboratory. One was to possess the capability, and the will, to bring diverse skills and a new outlook to solving problems, whether enduring dilemmas or new ones, that were of central importance to the Laboratory’s mission—principally, the design and testing of nuclear weapons. The second role was to help maintain for the Laboratory a position at the forefront of experimental science in the broadest possible sense. This balance of mission-related and basic research not only captured for me Los Alamos’ greatest strength but also made P Division an extraordinary combination of people. The principal challenge was elegantly captured by Harold Agnew in an informal talk to Laboratory management upon the announcement of his retirement as Director of the Laboratory. As I recall his meaning, if not the precise words, he told us that he had seen his job as “looking to new times and sowing the seeds for Los Alamos’ future. Now with that done, it was time to do some careful weeding.”

Our challenge in P Division was not only to support the “weeding” process but also (and even more importantly) to nurture the new plants and to keep excellence as our overarching criterion for judgment. With this perspective in mind and with Laboratory organization assuming a new measure of attention, P Division gradually absorbed major parts of Laser (L) Division’s laser-fusion program and J Division’s nuclear-testing diagnostics. Because the Space and Astrophysics Program (P-4) was self-sustaining, it was established as a separate division to make P Division manageable. Our challenge then was to make the whole a coherent research enterprise insulated as much as possible from the increasingly pervasive tendrils of bureaucratic Washington while recognizing the inevitable requirement for more accountability. The fact that more accountability was demanded was not the question—that was clear when the Atomic Energy Commission became the Energy and Research Development Administration and then the Department of Energy. What was, and remains, unclear was to whom we would be accountable. My own conclusion, now difficult to defend for its appearance of insularity, is one I would still make today—to choose the relative ease of identifying excellence in the conduct of scientific research in preference to the changing whims of government organizations. In practice, of course, we did both. But I came to rely more and more on the good counsel of proven judgment from people both internal and external to the Laboratory. Peter Carruther’s direction of T Division was one important model. George Cowan’s development of radiochemistry was another. The addition of Herb Anderson and John Wheatley to P Division added much insight. Outside reviewers, especially Luis Alvarez, became important sources of input to me. And most of all, my relationship with Edward Teller did then, and continued later, to make a big difference.

As perhaps the most complete scientist I have known, Edward has rare insight into the blend of science and technology. He is as much at home with researchers in neutrino physics as he is with designers of laser-fusion targets. His nearly unbound interests range from history, philosophy, and music to foreign and defense policy. A press article once labeled him a “monomaniac.” Correcting that perception of himself, he explained to me, “I said I am not a monomaniac; in fact, I have several monomanias.” Like every truly creative person, Edward makes errors. I have benefited greatly from his insight and advice—the debt I owe him is not one I can repay.

Edward is often at his best when he resorts to first principles. Anyone who knows him is used to his way of initiating discussion. He would simply ask, “What single thing interests you most?” Once, when I responded by describing the debate over the neutrino rest mass, he thought for a moment, took up a large pad of paper, and spent eight hours developing a field-theoretical treatment of neutrinos. Only then did he acknowledge this as a worthwhile interest.

Inertial fusion was a particularly demanding area during my tenure in P Division—one in which Edward played a major role. It tended to divide people into two groups. One group saw inertial fusion as a better path to fusion power generation than magnetic confinement; the other group saw it as a laboratory for high energy-density physics. My own interpretation was toward the latter, and I had a kindred spirit from L Division in Damon Giovanielli, who later became one of my successors as P-Division Leader. The two perspectives overlapped of course, but the split led to a failure of accountability. Bigger lasers were justified on the basis of their proximity to that elusive goal of “break even.” Yet the physics was revealing itself as even more complex—an old story in fusion research.

View of the 1981 experimental setup at LAMPF of Experiment 517, which involved the measurement of spin correlation. The effort was a collaboration between Texas A&M University; the University of California, Los Angeles; Washington State University; and the physics Division at Los Alamos. Brad Tippens (center) worked on this effort for his Ph.D. thesis.

We sought to use Los Alamos expertise in CO2 lasers to resolve the role of hot electrons and to study a regime of energy and power densities that approached that in nuclear weapons. It was good science, it offered an adjunct to nuclear tests, and it could attract top minds to the Laboratory. Edward Teller helped in guiding this change in trend in several ways. He contributed to the evaluation and design of important experiments, and he strengthened our working relationship with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Furthermore, he acquainted me with people who helped us proceed.

After thirteen years, I left Los Alamos in 1981. I had nothing but gratitude to offer. As for my tenure in directing P Division, I counted as the one memorable success the excellent people who joined us. I had just two regrets, however. I left John Browne with a job only partially done, and I left Greg Canavan just a few months after enticing him to Los Alamos. Their subsequent accomplishments absolved me of responsibility but failed to remove my regrets.

LA-12501-PR

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