

*Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century:
Rethinking Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Elements of
the Deterrent*

Implementation Strategy

Co-Chairs: Mim John and Bob Barker
Rapporteur: Patrice Stevens

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The Task: Implementation Strategy


Within the new triad concept in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), what is required and what obstacles need to be overcome to transform strategic capabilities in order to optimize readiness and responsiveness in the 21st century?

- Strategic capabilities: ability to decisively alter an adversary's basic course of action
- Readiness: ability to promptly execute strategic missions with existing forces and capabilities
- Responsiveness: ability to augment existing forces with increased numbers and/or improved capability *more rapidly than evolving threats*




NPR defined a New Triad in a New Policy Context


- Policy of Deterrence evolved to one of assurance-dissuasion-deterrence-defeat (ADDD) to better call out specific goals and strategies
- The “New Triad” made explicit interplay among a number of elements
 - Offense-defense
 - Readiness and response
 - Nuclear and non-nuclear strike
 - Command and Control (C2), Intelligence, & Planning




A Re-Interpretation of the New Triad Better Captures the Dynamics of AD4D




Key Issues for Strategic Capabilities in the Context of Readiness and Responsiveness



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


*C3ISR & Planning to Support Strike Needs Improvement at Every Level**



*Defense Science Board Report. *Future Strategic Strike Forces*, February 2004.

Key Issues for Strategic Capabilities in the Context of Readiness and Responsiveness




Non-Nuclear Strike Forces

- Deployed
 - Numerous
 - Tested in operations
 - Modern technology
 - Adaptable to multiple delivery platforms
 - *Survivability in an adversary's nuclear environment?*
- In development
 - Continuous pipeline of new capabilities
- Infrastructure
 - Fully exercised, easily expanded
 - Acquisition still not as agile as we might like



*Nuclear Strike Forces: The Vision for **Readiness** and **Responsiveness***



Nuclear Strike: Department of Energy

- Deployed weapons
 - Life extensions of Cold War systems
- In development
 - Recent Nuclear Weapons Council approval of Reliable Replacement Warhead 1 (RRW1)
 - RRW will provide added safety and security, plus confidence through “replacement”
 - However, by law, the program introduces no new military capability
- Infrastructure
 - RRW to exercise infrastructure fully for first time in ~15 years
 - Current plans would assure continuous operation through gradual change-out of all legacy warheads
 - National Nuclear Security Administration Complex 2030 Plan provides roadmap for modernizing aging infrastructure
 - *Capacity still uncertain: How much infrastructure vs. how many deployed and reserve weapons needed in 20 to 30 years?*



Nuclear Strike: Department of Defense

- Deployed platforms
 - Life extensions of Cold War systems
- In development
 - Currently, none
 - RRW decision should lead to some change
- Infrastructure
 - Eroding rapidly with a single bright spot*



* Defense Science Board Report. *Future Strategic Strike Skills*, March 2006.

* Threat Reduction Advisory Report, *An Evaluation to DoD's Responsive Infrastructure for Strategic Strike*, 2006. Rev. 14

Key Issues – or Opportunities?

- Understanding of what deters our adversaries
 - To ensure that *strategic* strike capabilities achieve *strategic* goals
- Decision-making process that supports timely strike
 - Requires highest levels of leadership involvement
- Nuclear weapons on conventional delivery platforms
 - Introduces both technical and political questions, but offers a cost effective and timely path for modernizing nuclear strike systems
- Conventional weapons on nuclear delivery platforms
 - Much done already with bomber force and SSGN
 - Congressional resistance to conventional Trident missile (CTM)
- A roadmap for strategic strike
 - Currently lacking integration of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities
 - Limited DoD leadership support prior to RRW
- A strong analytical base
 - The Nation needs answers to key questions, e.g.,
 - How do both nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities contribute to ADSD?
- A common vision on role of nuclear weapons in future strategic landscape
 - US Strategic Command and Department of Energy have created RRW, but only addresses warheads
 - Many disparate views within DoD and Congress
 - Legislative prohibition on new nuclear capabilities

